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Abstract: With the ongoing digitalisation of our everyday tasks, more and more eGovernment ser-
vices make it possible for citizens to take care of their administrative obligations online. This type
of services requires a certain assurance level for user authentication. To meet these requirements,
a digital identity issued to the citizen is essential. Nowadays, due to the widespread use of smart-
phones, mobile user authentication is often favoured. This naturally supports two-factor authentica-
tion schemes (2FA). We use the term mobile derived identity to stress two aspects: a) the identity
is enabled for mobile usage and b) the identity is somehow derived from a physical or digital proof
of identity. This work reviews 21 systems that support mobile derived identities. One subset of the
considered systems is already in place (public or private sector in Europe), another subset is subject
to research. Our goal is to identify prevalent design and implementation aspects for these systems
in order to gain a better understanding on best practises and common views on mobile derived iden-
tities. We found, that research prefers storing identity data on the mobile device itself whereas real
world systems usually rely on cloud storage. 2FA is common in both worlds, however biometrics as
second factor is the exception.
Keywords: Derived identities, design aspects, eGovernment, assurance levels
1 Introduction
Many online services require the unambiguous identification and authentication of users
by the respective service providers. To reduce the risk of identity theft, two-factor authen-
tication (2FA) schemes are more and more in place. The omnipresence of smartphones
[rB16] make these devices a natural choice for the second factor (possession), e.g. by us-
ing the embedded SmartCard or a personalised app, cf. [TVZ16].
Online services provided by governments require special attention. For example, the Eu-
ropean eIDAS regulation [EU14] and the ISO-15408 [IS09] define requirements for the
technical realisation of eGovernment online authentication processes to fulfil predefined
assurance levels. On the provider side, services are assigned to these assurance levels. This
way, it can be ensured, that certain security and data sensitive processes can only be pro-
ceeded online if the authentication of a user and the corresponding online service operate
on the same assurance level.
1 Extended Version of Daniel Tra¨der, Alexander Zeier, and Andreas Heinemann, “Design and Implementation
Aspects of Mobile Derived Identities”, in Open Identity Summit 2017
2 University of Applied Science Darmstadt, Fachbereich Informatik, Haardtring 100, 64295 Darmstadt
{daniel.traeder|alexander.zeier|andreas.heinemann}@h-da.de. This work was funded by the Hessian Ministry
of the Interior and Sports (HMdIS) within the “Round Table Cybersecurity@Hessen”.
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2One important aspect is how the enrolment of a user’s digital identity takes place, meaning
the initial secure association of the identity data with a real person. If a proof of identity
(digital or physical), that was already verified by a trusted third party, is at hand, we call
this new identity digital derived identity. Provided that this digital derived identity can be
used for mobile authentication, we call this a mobile derived digital identity.
proof of 
identity
derived 
digital 
identity
trust anchor
derivation
Fig. 1: Derived digital identity
Derived digital identities are characterised by the fact that they are linked to the proof of
identity from which they were derived. This proof of identity is acting as a trust anchor,
which is illustrated in Figure 1.
The concept of digital derived identities leads to a number of interesting questions in terms
of design and implementation:
• How does the derivation process from the initial identity takes place?
• Where is the derived identity3 stored and how is the access secured?
• How often can a derived identity be generated?
During the course of this work, 21 publications from research on mobile derived identities
as well as systems already in place were analysed and essential design and implementation
aspects were gathered. This paper provides an overview of our findings.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: First, we give an overview of related
work (Section 2). Next, Section 3 covers important aspects that we identified regarding
the design and implementation of mobile derived identities. Based on these aspects more
details on implementations are presented in Section 4 before we summarise and conclude
this work (Section 5).
2 Related Work
Kubach et al. [Ku15] investigate mobile identity solutions in Europe, both in the public and
private sector. Their work provides a deeper technical insight into some of the solutions
3 Further used as a short form for digital derived identity.
3for mobile identities. Gemalto [Ge14] provides an overview of public sector mobile eID
solutions. The Dutch Institute for Public Administration [Du15] looks at European eID
solutions with a focus on financial aspects and is limited to few mobile solutions.
To our knowledge, this is the first work that systematically investigates design and imple-
mentation aspects of mobile derived digital identities within European countries as well as
relevant research contributions in this field.
3 Design and Implementation Aspects
The realisation of mobile derived identities requires a proof of identity (a previous issued
digital identity or a physical ID card/document) as well as a mobile device. The smart-
phone is a canonical representative of a mobile device. However, other wearables [Ma98]
such as smart watches, fitness trackers etc. are also conceivable, as long as they have the
possibility to connect directly or indirectly to an online service.
In the remainder of this section we elaborate more on the important design and implemen-
tation aspects we identified.
Storage: The foremost aspect addresses the storage location of the mobile derived iden-
tity. There are two options: local on the mobile device itself or remote in the cloud. If
the derived identity is stored locally, special precautions must be taken to prevent unau-
thorised access. Secure storage (e.g. a Secure Element [Gl17]) or SmartCards are typical
options here). Storing the derived identity in the cloud requires a cryptographic protection
of the identity. Access must be granted only by means of the owner of the derived identity.
Typically, a private key of an asymmetric cryptographic scheme is used in this context.
Registration and Enrolment: For the initial generation of a derived identity and its reg-
istration with an identity management system, a process in the real world and an online
process can be distinguihed. In both cases, the user has to provide his own identity proof
and his own mobile device. A real world registration process would be a visit to an author-
ity which once again checks the authenticity of the identity proof and then generates the
derived identity and places it on the mobile device.
For an online process further hardware (e.g. a card reader, a NFC reader, a camera) is often
needed to verify the authenticity of the identity proof.
Authentication: The availability of a mobile device usually leads to the usage of a two-
factor authentication scheme when accessing an online service. In addition to the posses-
sion and exclusive access to the device (as a first factor), the second factor varies depending
on the capabilities of the device. Two possibilities are the knowledge of a secret (e.g. PIN)
or the use of biometric features (e.g. fingerprint, voice, iris etc.) which require biometric
sensors on the device.
Derivation: A last aspect of the initial generation of a derived identity is the number of
possible derived identities in existence, i.e. is it possible to use the initial identity proof
multiple times to derive an identity (e.g. to place it on different mobile devices)? If several
4derived identities are supported, one needs to specify whether these derived identities are
distinguishable from each other and whether they have to be revoked individually or as a
whole in case of loss or theft. Similarly, the technical requirements of the mobile devices
have to be specified accurately to secure access to the derived identities on all devices in
the same manner. For example, a derived identity must be stored equally secure on a smart
watch as on a smartphone with a SIM card.
4 Current Implementations of Mobile Derived Identities
The proposals and systems investigated in this paper are summarised in table 1 based on
the aspects discussed in section 3.
We notice, that many of the systems in use in European countries store the derived identity
in the cloud, while scientific papers prefer local storage.
Both, offline/real world and online registration are supported in most cases. The two-factor
authentication is present almost everywhere through knowledge and possession. Biometric
readouts are rarely supported and even then only optional. Likewise, the generation of
several derived identities is the exception.
We provide further details on individual systems below. The Registration and Enrolment
and Storage Location and Usage of Derived Identities aspects are considered, since their
implementations show remarkable differences.
4.1 Storage Location and Usage of Derived Identities
The majority of cloud storage solutions (gemalto Mobile ID [Ge17], Mobile ID (Estonia)
[Mob], Audkenni (Iceland) [Aud], Finish mobile ID [Mu13], MeID (Moldova) [CEG15],
MobilImza (Turkey) [GS12]) use the SIM card of a user’s phone to store a private key as
a credential while the identity itself is stored on a server. In this case, if a user wants to
authenticate against an online service, a signing request is sent to the user via the mobile
operator. The user gets prompted with a message asking him if he wants to accept the
execution of the initiated action. If he does so, the message gets signed in the background
and sent back to the service provider, which then checks the validity of the signature. If
successful, the user is authenticated.
Other cloud storage solutions (eHerkenning (Netherlands) [eHe], Chavel Mo´vel Digi-
tal (Portugal) [Cha17], SPID (Italy) [SPI], NemID (Denmark) [Nem], Handy-Signatur
(Austria) [Han], gemalto Mobile ID, Idensys (Netherlands) [Ide], GOV.UK Verify (Great
Britian) [GOV17]) store no additional data on the mobile device and make use of the user’s
phone, or more specifically their SIM card, as a second factor by sending a SMS with a
TAN code to the user which he then types into an input field in the browser, where the au-
thentication process was initiated. With some solutions, the TAN can also be received by
a smartphone application(Smart-ID (Estonia, Lithuania, Latvian) [Sma], GOV.UK Verify)
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8or e-mail4 (Chavel Mo´vel Digital (Portugal)). In case of Idensys, gemalto Mobile ID and
MIA (Austria) biometric features (face, fingerprint) can be used if a user has installed a
specific application on his device.
Locally stored derived identities are encrypted and saved on the device and the correspond-
ing key is stored in its secure element. In order to access the identity (e.g. during authen-
tication) the user has to provide a PIN code in most cases. In addition, ShoCard gives the
option to use face recognition or fingerprint analysis to access the identity. ShoCard is
also the only solution that makes use of a blockchain to store a signed hash of the user’s
identity. This way a 3rd party can check the validity of the identity by comparing it to the
stored hash in the blockchain. However, the identity itself is stored locally.
4.2 Registration and Enrolment
Most systems in use offer offline/real world registration. This on-site enrolment offers the
possibility to enrol locally either at an authority office, a bank branch, or at an office of
a mobile operator. This kind of enrolment is possible with ShoCard [Sho17], MIA (Aus-
tria) [TVZ16], Audkenni (Iceland), Chavel Mo´vel Digital (Portugal), SPID (Italy), Ne-
mID (Denmark), Handy-Signatur (Austria), Finish mobile ID (Finland), MeID (Moldova),
MobilImza (Turkey) and eHerkenning (Netherlands) [eHe]. Smart-ID (Estonia, Lithuania,
Latvian) [Sma] plans to introduce on-site enrolment.
The online enrolment is mostly performed with the help of an ID card with online ca-
pabilities. For the communication between the infrastructure provided by the government
and the ID card, a card reader is indispensable. This is provided by many solutions: Iden-
sys (Netherlands), Handy-Signatur (Austria), Finish mobile ID (Finland), SPID (Italy),
Mobile-ID (Estonia) [Mob], Smart-ID (Estonia, Lithuania, Latvian), Audkenni (Iceland),
SkIDentity [Hu15], [vdBHJ16], [SM13] and [SR12].
Other solutions provide an enrolment without the need of a card reader but only the ID
card. Chavel Mo´vel Digital (Portugal) and ShoCard make use of the machine readable
zone (MRZ) printed on every card. The MRZ is read out with a camera. Next, the data is
used as input for the generation of the derived identity.
GOV.UK Verify (Great Britain), eHerkenning (Netherlands), Finish mobile ID (Finland),
Handy-Signatur (Austria), NemID (Denmark) and Smart-ID (Estonia, Lithuania, Latvian)
cooperate with financial institutions for the registration based on previous online-banking
enrolment. In general there are two methods to register based on online-banking: A small
amount of money is transferred to the bank account of the registration provider. The proof
of identity is given to the person who commissioned the transaction. To enrol with the
second method, the customer of a bank has to answer questions about past bank trans-
actions. The questions are about the transferred and received money on the customer ac-
count, e.g. the amount and time of a specific transaction. In this solution, the knowledge
about past transactions proofs the identity of the account owner. SPID (Italy) offers a video
4 Here, any other device able to access the user’s e-mail is sufficient.
9identification. During a video chat an employee of the registration provider performs the
identification. Video identification is suggested by [vdBHJ16] as well.
In addition, a combination of offline and online actions that need to be carried out by a user
already exist. [OOM17] and ShoCard make use of a photo taken from the physical ID card
or just from the machine readable zone on the card. Whereas eHerkenning (Netherlands),
NemID (Denmark) and Handy-Signatur (Austria) make uses of the serial number which
has to be entered by the user in an online form. In all cases, a letter will be sent to the
registered address of the card holder. This letter holds private information to complete the
enrolment process.
5 Conclusion and Outlook
We have investigated prevalent design and implementation aspects of mobile derived iden-
tities. We studied 21 research contributions and systems used in practice. The most promi-
nent design criterion is the storage location (local or cloud) of a mobile derived identity.
It can be seen that most of the public sector solutions in European countries make use
of a cloud storage, while all (except [TVZ16]) scientific works considered prefer a local
storage on a personal device for the identity.
Most of the public sector solutions offer an on-site registration and enrolment. Two-factor
authentication is implemented in all considered systems. For NemID both factors are
knowledge. The use of biometric features as a second factor is the exception.
For the sake of completeness, we note, that in the context of eGovernment online ser-
vices legal requirements must be taken into account, see [EU14] for example, affecting the
design decisions.
As a next step, we will take a closer look at the different assurance levels and review
whether a derived identity shows the same assurance level as the identity from which it
was derived (this applies only for digital identities as an identity proof). In addition, we
want to look closer into usability issues of the various realisations, and how a citizen must
deal with loss or damage of their mobile device.
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